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ABSTRACT 
 
Discussion on overcapacity of lodging industry has persisted among academics and 
industry. Despite a general agreement on its negative effects, efforts to quantify overcapacity 
and investigate its cause have significantly lacked. Suspecting that these efforts are hindered 
by the present difficulty in evaluating the optimum capacity, this study provides a conceptual 
framework of a revenue-maximizing industry capacity under the theory of fundamental price. 
Moreover, as capacity decision is made before the demand is known, the effect of demand 
uncertainty on capacity decision is examined in conjunction. Results suggest that the US 
lodging industry has incentive to maintain excess capacity under demand uncertainty, while 
pronounced overcapacity cycles seem to be a result of demand shocks. Implications for the 
industry and suggestions for future research are discussed with the findings of the study. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since Dev and Hubbard (1989) introduced the term oversupply, the academia has 
frequently cited its adverse impact on the US lodging industry. Consequences of oversupply 
have been identified in the preceding literature, such as reduced average daily rates 
(Overstreet, 1989), lower occupancy rates (Mao & Gu, 2007), financial downturn (Brown & 
Dev, 1999), and less credit for investors due to expectation on impaired future cash flows 
(Singh & Kwansa, 1999). In spite of the undesirable nuance the term bears, historical periods 
of oversupply have been repeatedly observed (Mao & Gu, 2007; Ferreira & Gustafson, 2006). 
Despite the adverse effects and recurrences of oversupply, there has been a lack of 
discussion on the causes of oversupply. Some studies have noted funds from the REITs sector 
(Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002) and rise in property values (Rushmore & Baum, 2002) as 
potential drivers behind oversupply. While these are compelling reasons for the industry’s 
capacity surge, there seems to be a missing link as these are causes of overbuilding that led to 
oversupply. Overbuilding is considered as an irrational behavior of adding supply despite 
lack of demand (Grenadier, 1996). However, there is a time lag between the construction of 
hotel and when the demand is revealed (Van Mieghem, 2003). Oversupply may occur 
regardless of the hotelier’s intention to overbuild due to unforeseeable demand shocks. Easy 
procurement of funds and expected property appreciation could have led to overbuilding, in 
turn, resulting in oversupply. At the same time, oversupply may not always be a consequence 
of overbuilding. Given the demand uncertainty, there is always possibility of incidental 
under- or oversupply, even when the industry itself does not engage in overbuilding. 
Other complexities are also noted. For example, Laventhol and Horwath (1988) 
argued that it was a combination of oversupply and reduced demand that led to hotel 
bankruptcies. Nelson (1992) posited that oversupply of rooms and weaker economy together 
created a buyer’s market for rooms. Walker (1993) identified the problem Texas lodging 
industry faced as “not sluggish demand growth so much as oversupply”. Separation of supply 
and demand, however, may be equivocal. According to Kummerow (1999), oversupply is the 
state in which supply-demand imbalance exists so there is excess capacity. In other words, 
oversupply may be a result of abundant supply and/or lack of demand due to bad economic 
conditions, but it cannot be established independent of demand. 
Adding to confusion is the misconception on undersupply. Under-capacity, or lack of 
supply with respect to demand is likely to lead to higher prices and occupancy rates for the 
incumbent suppliers. Therefore, the result of undersupply may seem desirable for existing 
hotels (Woodworth & Mandelbaum, 2010). Yet, presence of unsatisfied demand suggests that 
the industry has potential revenue that is not realized. Conversely, if supply of the US lodging 
industry remains at under-capacity, hotels could sell out their rooms at a high price but the 
overall output (or revenue) would be degraded in the long term (Brown & Dev, 1999). Such 
scenario may not be the case for a competitive market like the lodging industry though, as 
new entrants would start rushing in as soon as they discover the business opportunity. 
Conceptually, if there exist such points of capacity level as under- or overcapacity, an 
optimum level should also exist. Further, if under- or oversupply induce suboptimal outcomes, 
the industry should be reluctant to add capacity just as much as they are to reduce capacity. 
Assuming that the industry adjusts capacity based on reasonably accurate demand forecasts, 
and that capacity adjustment strictly observes the optimum level, oversupply and undersupply 
should be realized with an equal likelihood. Nevertheless, undersupply has rarely been an 
issue, whereas a sizable number of publications have been concerned with overcapacity. Thus 
the research inquiry is summarized into two questions. First, were there overcapacity cycles 
in the US lodging industry as the literature cites? Second, if there were overcapacity cycles, 
were they a result of irrational overbuilding? To answer these questions, however, evaluation 
of the optimum capacity level is crucial, and estimating oversupply requires a reference point. 
 Following this line of reasoning, there are identifiable theoretical gaps and empirical 
questions in the literature on the US lodging industry supply. The inability to determine the 
optimal capacity implies for the academia lack of a valid measure to assess adequacy of room 
supply as well as the underlying forces driving oversupply cycles. Practitioners are left to 
make uninformed decisions on capacity, although the consequences of overcapacity are well 
known and likely to last as the excess capacity does not dissipate quickly (Chon & Singh, 
1993). Therefore, the current study purports to fill this gap by developing a general concept 
of optimum capacity under the economic theory of fundamental price, which argues that price 
is an outcome of the market equilibrium between supply and demand (Hott & Monnin, 2008). 
Specifically, the objectives of this study are to 1) develop a theoretical model to determine 
optimal capacity of the lodging industry, 2) estimate using a econometric model the optimal 
capacity of the US lodging industry between 1987 and 2010, and 3) examine the historical 
capacity mismatch during this period. Relevant implications for the industry and suggestions 
for future research are presented with the findings of the study. 
 
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2-1.Optimal Supply in the US lodging industry 
Dev and Hubbard (1989) first noted oversupply in the US lodging industry in the late 
1980s to early 1990s. Regarding the disappointing performance of the Texas lodging industry 
in the 1980s, Walker (1993) claimed that oversupply was the main cause. Singh and Kwansa 
(1999) revealed through a panel discussion that the overbuilding in 1980s led to tighter 
lending terms and scarcity of capital for the lodging industry from 1990 to 1993. Yet another 
cycle of oversupply was predicted for the US lodging industry in the late 1990s by Rushmore 
(1998). Mao and Gu (2007) later verified the oversupply in the early 2000s, to which the 
authors attributed depressed room rates, occupancy, and revenue. Recently, Woodworth and 
Mandelbaum (2010) indicated that the industry is again experiencing an oversupply of rooms 
since 2008, citing declining profits for the industry as evidence. 
While many studies directly linked oversupply to industry performance, others have 
emphasized the importance of supply-demand framework in price determination. Overstreet 
(1989) argued that excess rooms on the market caused the hotels to achieve lower average 
daily rates. Examining the room demand and supply of Las Vegas hotels, Tsai et al. (2006) 
posited that hotels’ bottom line is affected by the interrelationship between room supply and 
demand. More explicitly, Pan (2007) interpreted room supply as a constraint on hotels’ 
pricing strategy with respect to demand. It is observed that in general, the literature interprets 
effect of capacity mismatch in terms of supply-demand interaction. In essence, overcapacity 
is expected to limit the industry’s pricing ability by the law of supply and demand. 
However, presumably due to the favorable statements of the hotels, consequences of 
undersupply have not received as much attention. Lack of market supply with respect to 
demand may result in higher occupancy and average daily rates for incumbent hotels, but 
they may have occurred in lieu of potential sales that could have been generated by adding 
capacity (Brown & Dev, 1999). Acknowledged this dilemma, deRoos (1999) contended that 
unutilized capacity is justified as long as changes in average daily rate are not triggered, 
taking an important step of identifying investment opportunity in an industry where capacity 
cannot be fully utilized. Yet deRoos (1999) provides inconclusive evidence as absorbing new 
demand does not constitute optimum alone. If benefit from improved pricing ability is greater 
than that from selling more rooms at lower price, adding new rooms is not optimal. Thus the 
current study tests for optimality of capacity level that does not induce changes to room rates, 
using the supply-demand framework of fundamental price. 
2-2. Effective Supply and Natural Occupancy Rate 
Hotel rooms can never be fully utilized. Due to persistent seasonality decision on 
room capacity must be made between the two extremes of demand cycles. Room capacity 
will be set so that there is some overcapacity in slow seasons, provided that in times of high 
demand it will generate higher revenues (Kalnins, 2006). While the same applies to each city, 
state, or region managing their supply so that the “average” potential outcome is optimized, 
the industry is aggregation of all properties. It immediately follows that industry supply is 
also subject to demand-driven cycles. This suggests that the optimal capacity of the lodging 
industry can be expressed as a ratio between demand and rooms, or an occupancy percentage. 
 Persistent surplus of rooms indicates that there is always some inefficiency with 
aggregate supply. At aggregate level, not all rooms are equally demanded or substitutable 
among one another as the demand is selective. 
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2-3. Uncertainty and Oversupply
 It is important to reiterate that choices on capacity are made before demand is known. 
At best, the individual has a good estimate of the future demand (Van Mieghem
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2-4. Equilibrium Determination of Price 
In “fundamental” price theory, demand and supply determine price through 
equilibrium (Hott & Monnin, 2008; Quigley, 1999). Excess supply degrades pricing ability, 
whereas lack of supply results in higher guest bids. This relationship can be represented as: 
 Pt = f(QDt, QSt)       (1) 
where P is the price of hotel rooms, QD is the number of rooms demanded, QS is the number 
of room in supply, and subscript t denotes the month. At t, supply of room is exogenous, as it 
is committed prior to t. The demand is endogenous, as hotels practice revenue management to 
respond to demand shifts. Expressed with a matrix of exogenous variables X, the demand is: 
 QDt = f(Pt, Xt)        (2) 
We propose that average price for a hotel room, Pt*, is determined by the equilibrium 
between demand and supply at every time point, Qt*=QDt=QSt. Greater demand will shift the 
price upward, whereas an increase in supply will force the price downward, and according to 
deRoos’ (1999), a revenue-maximizing demand-to-supply ratio will exist so that it satisfies: 
∆P/∆QD + ∆P/∆QS = 0      (3) 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
3-1. Sample and Data 
Monthly data of the US lodging industry on average daily rates (ADR), room supply, 
and rooms sold from January 1987 to June 2010 was obtained from Smith Travel Research. 
ADR was deflated using consumer price index (CPI). Historical series are shown in Figure 2. 
Seasonality seems to be distinct throughout the period, while supply shows some signs of 
efforts to align with demand. Data is not adjusted for seasonality to preserve variance (Tang 
& Jang, 2010), while under the equilibrium framework seasonal price variation should be 
explained by relative demand and supply. Since level data renders difficulty in interpretation, 
natural logs of the series were taken to utilize a log-linear form, also known as the elasticity 
model. Furthermore, as the strictly positive series suggest that they are integrated of order one 
(Wooldridge, 2009), mean-reverting processes of first differences were used. 
 
Figure 2. Historical ADR, Supply, and Demand of US Lodging Industry 
3-2. Functional Form 
 The following log-difference equation was used to examine the effect of relative 
changes in supply and demand on relative changes of the fundamental room rate: 
 ∆ln(ADRt) = β0 + β1∆ln(NIGHTt) + β2∆ln(ROOMt) + εt  (4) 
where ADR is the industry average daily rate, NIGHT is rooms sold, ROOM is the number of 
rooms in supply, and ε is the error term. It is also noteworthy that E(β0) = 0, since no change 
in fundamental price should follow if relative supply and relative demand remain same. 
 In the demand equation, the lagged price variable was used as an instrument to avoid 
endogeneity (Canina & Carvell, 2005). Although GDP is commonly cited as the most 
powerful explanatory variable for lodging demand (Smith, 2008), GDP series is only 
available in quarterly form. Therefore, the Coincident Index (CI) developed by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia was utilized. The CI is constructed from four indicators of non-
farm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, unemployment rate, and 
wage and salary disbursements, deflated by CPI, and set to trends in GDP. The index provides 
researchers with a comprehensive measure of economic activity and is used to characterize 
business cycles (Owyang, Piger, & Wall, 2005). After including monthly dummies to account 
for seasonality, the demand equation is specified as: 
∆ln(NIGHTt) = β3 + β4∆ln(ADRt-1) + β5∆ln(CIt) + β6-16ΣM1-11 + υt (5) 
where CI is the Coincident Index and M1–11 are the monthly dummies (base=January). The 
simultaneous equations (4) and (5) are estimated by three-stage least squares (3SLS) method 
and also two-stage least squares (2SLS), while the former is advocated for efficient estimates 
of endogenous equations system compared to latter (Tamirisa & Igan, 2008). 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4-1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the data. Real ADR had a mean of $51.17 
and a standard deviation of $2.74, indicating little change in the fundamental price for rooms 
during the period. ROOMS and NIGHT consistently and significantly deviate from the mean 
with considerable variance, displaying high seasonality. Similarity between CI and CPI 
should also be noted. This implies that if the average daily rates are not deflated by the CPI, 
high multicollinearity will be inevitable between the CI and ADR. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=282) 
Variable Definition Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev 
ADR ADR deflated by CPI 51.17  45.13  57.69  2.74  
ROOMS Room supply 119,112,766  80,472,336  150,187,808  16,751,548  
NIGHT Rooms sold 73,730,982  44,712,378  99,595,040  12,597,165  
CI Coincident index 149.72  100.00  194.67  29.49  
CPI Consumer Price Index 149.24  100.00  197.81 27.49  
M1~11 Monthly dummies – – – – 
 
4-2. Estimation Results 
 Table 2 shows estimation results. The demand equation is consistent with the 
preceding literature (Canina & Carvell, 2005). 1% increase in average daily rates leads to 
roughly .33% decrease in demand the following month, while 1% increase in Coincident 
Index leads to 1.19% demand increase. Significance and magnitude of monthly dummies 
underscore the high seasonality of room demand. The price equation yielded interesting 
results. Demand and supply variables were both significant at p<.01. 1% increase in room 
nights, ceteris paribus, leads to approximately .15% increase in ADR, while 1% increase in 
supply causes about .16% decrease in ADR, all others same. That one-percent increases in 
both room nights and supply causes the room rate to drop slightly suggests the US lodging 
industry had a slight oversupply during the period. The size of the intercept is very close to 
zero, while its statistical significance is extremely low. The interpretation is intuitive in that 
without changes in relative supply and demand, the equilibrium room rate will not change. 
Table 2. Estimation Results 
Variable 
2SLS 3SLS 
      se() t-stat       se() z-stat 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(NIGHTSt) 
∆ln(ADRt-1) –0.342*** 0.127 –2.70 –0.328** 0.123 –2.66 
∆ln(CCIt) 1.287* 0.513 2.51 1.188* 0.498 2.38 
FEBDUMMY 0.018* 0.009 2.01 0.020* 0.009 2.22 
MARDUMMY 0.136*** 0.008 16.03 0.140*** 0.008 16.90 
APRDUMMY –0.077*** 0.006 –12.64 –0.072*** 0.006 –12.22 
MAYDUMMY –0.008 0.006 –1.38 –0.004 0.006 –0.77 
JUNDUMMY 0.014* 0.006 2.29 0.018** 0.006 3.15 
JULDUMMY 0.007 0.006 1.08 0.009 0.006 1.54 
AUGDUMMY –0.055*** 0.007 –8.43 –0.053*** 0.006 –8.37 
SEPDUMMY –0.166*** 0.006 –25.74 –0.163*** 0.006 –26.08 
OCTDUMMY –0.007 0.006 –1.23 –0.006 0.006 –1.09 
NOVDUMMY –0.226*** 0.008 –29.73 –0.223*** 0.007 –30.18 
DECDUMMY –0.190*** 0.006 –31.48 –0.188*** 0.006 –32.00 
Constant 0.045*** 0.005 9.00 0.043*** 0.005 8.77 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ln(ADRt) 
∆ln(NIGHTSt) 0.154*** 0.011 13.62 0.154*** 0.011 13.69 
∆ln(ROOMSt) –0.163*** 0.022 –7.45 –0.163*** 0.022 –7.49 
Constant –0.000 0.001 –0.27 –0.000 0.001 –0.27 
N=280; Superscripts denote: ***: p<0.001; **: p<0.01; *:p<0.05 
Demand equation (2SLS) R2:0.96; F-stat: 518 (3SLS) R2:0.96; χ2:7100; Price equation (2SLS) R2:0.43; F-stat: 94 (3SLS) R2:0.43; χ2:191 
4-3. Equilibrium Analysis 
Accordingly, the demand-to-supply ratio that does not change room rates can be 
computed. ADR will not change when 1% increase in room nights is compensated with 
a .9456% increase in room supply. From the data, we compute that it is optimal to add 
approximately 1.535 rooms for every additional room night per day. Alternatively, the 
optimal average occupancy can be calculated so that the proportionate percentage changes of 
demand and supply do not influence room rates. Solving for this ratio using the geometric 
mean of room nights and supply yields QS*=65.13%. At this occupancy level, simultaneous 
one-percent increases in both demand and supply will not affect the room rates. 
The results further prove that industry revenue is maximized when the demand-
supply equilibrium is consistently reached so that price change is not induced, as Figure 3 
illustrates. The initial equilibrium is at E1. If the demand for rooms increases from QD to QD’ 
but the effective room supply remains the same (E1 → E2), the ADR increases from P to P’ 
which implies that there is some unsatisfied demand (undersupply equilibrium). If the 1.535 
rooms were to be added per additional room night, (Q
unchanged, and room night increase would be from Q
symmetry, is twice of that at undersupply equilibrium.
where the effective supply is increased but demand remains the same, thereby pushing the 
ADR down from P to P’’ although quantity remains the same at Q
is little incentive for the industry to undersupply, as approximately one percent of 
loss only translates to increase in room rate by .154%. The effect of oversupply, on the other 
hand, is not seen as harmful. With 1% of oversupply the room rate would be competed down 
by .163%, while there is still no loss in room sales. 
Figure 3. Price E
4-4. Effect of Uncertainty 
Unfortunately, capacity management relies on expectations of future demand from 
imperfect forecasts. The industry must decide on the optimal level of supply to maximize 
revenue based on a reasonably 
evaluate the best strategy before demand is known, we can look at the expected outcome of 
deviations from the optimum capacity when the supply
illustrate this, numerical simulations are presented in Figure 5, a (11
based on supply and demand changes using the estimated coefficients from Table 2. Since 
demand is revealed after supply is fixed, the column is chosen by the industry and then the 
row is unveiled. The optimal ex post
is realized when percentage changes in demand and supply are exactly matched. However, 
assuming that the respective demand level is realized with equal probability (each cell having 
one-eleventh probability), the best 
approximately 4% of excess supply over the optimal level.
Table 3. Expected 
Demand 
Change 
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–4% 
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-3.93% -3.08% -2.23%
+3% 
 
-3.78% -2.93% -2.07%
+4% 
 
-3.64% -2.78% -1.92%
+5% 
 
-3.49% -2.63% -1.77%
Average -4.23% -3.46% -2.80%
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ⅹ11) matrix of outcomes 
 outcome is shown in bold for each demand level, which 
ex ante strategy for the lodging industry is to maintain 
 
Outcome based on Equally Distributed E
Supply Change 
% -2% -1% 0% +1% +2% +3
 -5.42% -5.58% -5.73% -5.89% -6.04% -6.19%
 -4.28% -4.44% -4.59% -4.75% -4.90% -5.06%
 -3.13% -3.29% -3.45% -3.61% -3.76% -3.92%
 -1.98% -2.14% -2.30% -2.46% -2.62% -2.78%
 -1.83% -0.99% -1.15% -1.31% -1.47% -1.64%
 -1.68% -0.84% 0.00% -0.16% -0.33% -0.49%
 -1.53% -0.69% 0.15% 0.99% 0.83% 0.66%
 -1.38% -0.53% 0.31% 1.15% 1.98% 1.81%
 -1.23% -0.38% 0.46% 1.30% 2.14% 2.97%
 -1.07% -0.23% 0.62% 1.46% 2.29% 3.13%
 -0.92% -0.07% 0.77% 1.61% 2.45% 3.29%
 -2.22% -1.74% -1.36% -1.06% -0.86% -0.75%
3, which imposing 
room sale 
 
rrors 
% +4% +5% 
 -6.35% -6.50% 
 -5.21% -5.37% 
 -4.08% -4.24% 
 -2.94% -3.10% 
 -1.80% -1.96% 
 -0.65% -0.82% 
 0.50% 0.33% 
 1.65% 1.48% 
 2.80% 2.63% 
 3.96% 3.79% 
 4.12% 4.95% 
 -0.73% -0.80% 
As the probability distribution in Table 3 is unrealistic for any modern forecasting 
model, a normal probability density function was used to replicate a matrix that better 
visualizes industry practices. Table 4 shows the outcome matrices, assuming that demand 
forecast errors (in percentages) are normally distributed with zero mean and standard 
deviations of 1~3. Each cell contains the sum of products between probability density and 
expected revenue change at respective supply levels. By examining Table 4, the relationship 
between forecasting accuracy and oversupply becomes evident. As the error variance 
increases, the expected outcome deteriorates. Moreover, the industry’s ex ante position 
improves by adding supply. The best strategy for room capacity increases by one percent as 
the standard deviation of the error increases by 1. Under imperfect forecasting, the US 
lodging industry is better off to maintain excess capacity with respect to the expected demand 
level than under-capacity. Overcapacity will not necessarily result in optimal outcome, but it 
offers the highest expected revenue ex ante given some probability distribution of future 
demand, especially those resembling a normal distribution. 
Table 4. Expected Outcome based on Normally Distributed Errors 
Demand change Supply Change 
–5%  –4%  –3%  –2%  –1%  0% +1%  +2%  +3%  +4%  +5%  
Standard deviation = 1 
E(Outcome) -4.23% -3.37% -2.53% -1.69% -0.94% -0.43% -0.26% -0.34% -0.49% -0.65% -0.81% 
            Standard deviation = 2 
E(Outcome) -4.23% -3.39% -2.58% -1.85% -1.24% -0.80% -0.56% -0.49% -0.54% -0.66% -0.81% 
            Standard deviation = 3 
E(Outcome) -4.23% -3.42% -2.70% -2.06% -1.52% -1.12% -0.84% -0.69% -0.65% -0.69% -0.80% 
 
Considering effects of uncertainty, we now turn to adequacy of the historical capacity 
of the US lodging industry using the optimal occupancy rate: QS*=65.13%. Oversupply of 
rooms is defined as the actual supply of rooms less the optimal supply of rooms (demand 
multiplied by 1/.6513), divided by total rooms for percentage figures. Uncertainty is 
accounted for by adding two percent excess capacity to the optimal supply, which would have 
been the best ex ante strategy assuming the standard deviation of forecasting error is 2. Figure 
4 displays the historical capacity adequacy of the industry between 1987-2010. The upper 
curve represents the historical changes in actual overcapacity, while the bottom curve 
represents overcapacity with respect to the best ex ante capacity strategy. 
 
Figure 4. Identified Overcapacity Pattern in the US Lodging Industry, 1987–2010 
While overcapacity persisted throughout the period, after accounting for uncertainty 
the excess supply was largely within the boundary of reasonable strategic decisions. There 
were even periods when the industry supply was lower than the level that would maximize 
expected outcome, for example in 1989 and from 1994 to 1997. Quantity oversupplied was as 
well very small, and not surprisingly, these periods are considered as prosperous periods for 
the industry (Woodworth & Mandelbaum, 2010). Three distinctive peak periods are noted, 
however, for years 1991, 2001~2003, and 2008~2010. These periods approximately coincide 
with the recessionary periods defined by National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
while the 2001 decline in demand is also accounted for by the September 11 attacks. 
Although caution should be used, the results seem to suggest that overcapacity is not caused 
by aggressive overbuilding, but rather by unexpected demand shocks. Nevertheless, an 
upward trend in the magnitude and duration of overcapacity is witnessed, as the market 
continuously grows and capacity reduction is intricate. From the results we recommend that 
capacity managers in the industry should carefully consider broader economic cycles as well 
as macro socio-economic events occurring with low probability. Similar to the collapse of 
financial market, capacity planning of the lodging industry may have suffered from use of 
Gaussian-family probability distributions vulnerable to extreme events (Poon et al., 2004). 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This study identified the theoretical gap and empirical questions in the literature on 
oversupply of the US lodging industry and provided a conceptual framework of optimum 
capacity based on the theory of fundamental price. As expected, estimation through a 
simultaneous equations model revealed that US lodging industry had historical oversupply, 
and an optimum capacity level existed as a ratio to the total demand of 1.53, or equivalently 
as an occupancy rate of 65.13%. Undersupply offered little benefit from price gain compared 
to the loss of potential room sales. On the contrary, the effect of oversupply was not as 
detrimental, as the loss in average daily rate was not sizable relative to the potential loss in 
room sales. Consequently, overcapacity of the industry was justified to some extent. 
 Another interesting finding was the effect of uncertainty on industry supply. It was 
observed that as uncertainty increases, the industry could be better off by adding more supply 
than indicated by the optimum level. No matter how much the technique improves, there will 
always be some error associated with the forecast of future demand, which implies that some 
oversupply will be always justified for the industry. An examination of the historical 
oversupply showed that although the US lodging industry persistently recorded overcapacity, 
it did not greatly deviate from the optimum level, given the inherent uncertainty. The results 
suggest that overcapacity may not be due to irrational overbuilding, as the industry clearly 
has an incentive for excess capacity. It is noted, however, that the capacity planners in 
industry may have been relying on forecasting models that are vulnerable to extreme events. 
Contributions of the study are threefold. First, in line with the work of deRoos (1999), 
the study enhances the field’s understanding of capacity for lodging firms. As there will 
always be some inefficiency with hangover capacity “naturally unoccupied,” the optimal 
number of rooms should be greater than the total room nights sold in a given period. Second, 
the study identifies the capacity optimum for the US lodging industry using revenue-
maximizing framework, which in turn would enable better assessment of historical capacity 
levels and effectiveness in future capacity management endeavors. Third, the effects of 
under- and oversupply are jointly observed, proving that undersupply is less desirable for the 
industry than oversupply, especially when demand is unknown and forecasts are imperfect. 
 This study is not without limitations. The equilibrium model assumes relatively 
constant structure of the aggregate supply and demand, such as geographic distribution of the 
hotels and demand cycles. In practice, some other objective may be used to identify optimum 
capacity, while it should be noted that views of what is an optimum level may vary by 
individual firms. In addition, the long-run effect of capacity addition on demand generation 
could be another factor that could be incorporated into decision making. Nevertheless, the 
current study is expected to contribute significantly in developing a common understanding 
on overcapacity and identifying the optimum capacity level of the US lodging industry. In 
this light, further studies on criteria of determining the optimal capacity level, use of new and 
detailed data, and improvement of the endogenous model are warranted. These efforts should 
be consistently made into the future, as the trend in oversupply may be a signal that the 
research has, to a large extent, ignored the importance of supply-demand match to date. 
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